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Abstract 
Evaluation of counterfactual queries (e.g., "If 
A were true, would C have been true?") is 
important to fault diagnosis, planning, and 
determination of liability. In this paper we 
present methods for computing the proba­
bilities of such queries using the formulation 
proposed in [Balke and Pearl, 1994], where 
the antecedent of the query is interpreted as 
an external action that forces the proposi­
tion A to be true. When a prior probability 
is available on the causal mechanisms gov­
erning the domain, counterfactual probabil­
ities can be evaluated precisely. However, 
when causal knowledge is specified as condi­
tional probabilities on the observables, only 
bounds can computed. This paper develops 
techniques for evaluating these bounds, and 
demonstrates their use in two applications: 
(1) the determination of treatment efficacy 
from studies in which subjects may choose 
their own treatment, and (2) the determina­
tion of liability in product-safety litigation. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
A counterfactual sentence has the form 
If A were true, then C would have been true 
where A, the counterfactual antecedent, specifies an 
event that is contrary to one's real-world observations, 
and C, the counterfactual consequent, specifies a re­
sult that is expected to hold in the alternative world 
where the antecedent is true. A typical instance is "If 
Oswald were not to have shot Kennedy, then Kennedy 
would still be alive" which presumes the factual knowl­
edge of Oswald's shooting Kennedy, contrary to the 
antecedent of the sentence. 
Because of the tight connection between counterfactu­
als and causal influences, any algorithm for computing 
solutions to counterfactual queries must rely heavily on 
causal knowledge of the domain. This leads naturally 
to the use of probabilistic causal networks, since these 
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networks combine causal and probabilistic knowledge 
and permit reasoning from causes to effects as well as, 
conversely, from effects to causes. 
To emphasize the causal character of counterfactuals, 
we adopt the interpretation in [Pearl, 1993b], accord­
ing to which a counterfactual sentence "If it were A, 
then B would have been" states that B would prevail 
if A were forced to be true by some unspecified action 
that is exogenous to the other relationships considered 
in the analysis. 
Causal theories specified in functional form (as in 
[Pearl and Verma, 1991, Druzdzel and Simon, 1993, 
Poole, 1993]) are sufficient for evaluating counterfac­
tual queries, whereas the causal information embed­
ded in Bayesian networks is not sufficient for the task. 
Every Bayes network can be represented by several 
functional specifications, each yielding different eval­
uations of a counterfactual. The problem is that, de­
ciding what factual information deserves undoing (by 
the antecedent of the query) requires a model of tem­
poral persistence, and, as noted in [Pearl, 1993c], such 
a model is not part of static Bayesian networks. Func­
tional specifications, however, implicitly contain the 
needed temporal persistence information. 
Consider an example with two variables A and B, rep­
resenting Ann and Bob's attendance, respectively, at 
a party (A = a1 when Ann is at the party, A = ao 
otherwise; B = b1 when Bob is at the party, B = bo 
otherwise), and it is believed that Ann's attendance 
has a causal influence on Bob's attendance, shown by 
the arrow A -+ B). Assume that previous behavior 
shows P(b1lai) = 0.9 and P(bolao) = 0.9. We observe 
that Bob and Ann are absent from the party and we 
wonder whether Bob would be there if Ann were there. 
The answer depends on the mechanism that accounts 
for the 10% exception in Bob's behavior. If the rea­
son Bob occasionally misses parties (when Ann goes) 
is that he is unable to attend (e.g., being sick or hav­
ing to finish a paper for U AI), then the answer to our 
query would be 90%. However, if the only reason for 
Bob's occasional absence (when Ann goes) is that he 
becomes angry with Ann (in which case he does ex­
actly the opposite of what she does), then the answer 
to our query is 100%, because Ann and Bob's current 
absence from the party proves that Bob is not angry. 
Thus, we see that the information contained in the con­
ditional probabilities on the observed variables is insuf­
ficient for answering counterfactual queries uniquely; 
some information about the mechanisms responsible 
for these probabilities is needed as well. Still, when 
only a probabilistic model is given, informative bounds 
on the counterfactual probabilities can often be de­
rived, and this paper provides a general framework for 
evaluating these bounds. 
The next section will introduce concise notation for ex­
pressing counterfactual queries. Section 3.2 will derive 
a general expression for counterfactual probabilities in 
terms of a functional specification. Section 3.3 will 
present a general procedure for evaluating bounds on 
counterfactual probabilities when only a probabilistic 
specification is supplied. Section 4 will apply this pro­
cedure for evaluating bounds on treatment effects in 
partial compliance studies, while Section 5 will demon­
strate the use of this procedure in product liability 
litigation. 
2 NOTATION 
Let the set of variables describing the world be desig­
nated by X= {X1,X2, . . .  ,Xn}· As part of the com­
plete specification of a counterfactual query, there are 
real-world observations that make up the background 
context. These observed values will be represented in 
the standard form Xt, x2, ... , Xn. In addition, we must 
represent the value of the variables in the counterfac­
tual world. To distinguish between Xi and the value 
of Xi in the counterfactual world, we will denote the 
latter with an asterisk; thus, the value of xi in the 
counterfactual world will be represented by x;. We 
will also need a notation to distinguish between events 
that might be true in the counterfactual world and 
those referenced explicitly in the counterfactual an­
tecedent. The latter are interpreted as being forced to 
the counterfactual value by an external action, which 
will be denoted by a hat (e.g., x). 
Thus, a typical counterfactual query will have the form 
"What is P(c•W, a, b)?" to be read as "Given that we 
have observed A = a and B = b in the real world, if 
A were a•, then what is the probability that C would 
have been c* ?" 
3 BOUNDS ON 
COUNTERFACTUALS 
In [Balke and Pearl, 1994], an algorithm was presented 
for evaluating the unique quantitative solutions to 
counterfactual queries when a functional model is 
given. In this section we briefly describe the form of 
the functional model using response-function variables 
and how the solution is evaluated uniquely. Then we 
deal with probabilistic specifications and show how 
bounds can be obtained by optimizing the solution 
above over all functional models consistent with the 
probabilistic specification. 
Counterfactual Probabilities 47 
3.1 FUNCTIONAL MODELS 
For the previously described party example, a func­
tional specification models the influence of Ann's at­
tendance (A) on Bob's attendance (B) by a determin­
istic function 
b = Fb(a, t:b) 
where t:b stands for all unknown factors that may in­
fluence Band the prior probability distribution P(t:b) 
quantifies the likelihood of such factors. For example, 
whether Bob has been grounded by his parents and 
whether Bob is angry at Ann could make up two pos­
sible components of t:b. Given a specific value for t:b, 
B becomes a deterministic function of A; hence, each 
value in t:0 's domain specifies a response function that 
maps each value of A to some value in B's domain. In 
general, the domain for fb could contain many compo­
nents, but it can always be replaced by an equivalent 
variable that is minimal, by partitioning the domain 
into equivalence regions, each corresponding to a sin­
gle response function [Pearl, 1993a]. Formally, these 
equivalence classes can be characterized as a function 
rb : dom( Eb ) --+ N, as follows: 
{ 0 if Fb(ao, q) = 0 & Fb(at, t:b) = 0 
1 if Fb(ao, t:b) = 0 & Fb(a1, t:b) = 1 
2 if Fb(ao, fb) = 1 & Fb(at, t:b) = 0 
3 if Fb(ao, t:b) = 1 & F0(ai, q) = 1 
Obviously, rb can be regarded as a random variable 
that takes on as many values as there are functions 
between A and B. We will refer to this domain­
minimal variable as a response-function variable. rb 
is closely related to the potential response variables in 
Rubin's model of counterfactuals [Rubin, 1974], which 
was introduced to facilitate causal inference in statis­
tical analysis [Balke and Pearl, 1993]. 
For this example, the response-function variable for 
B has a four-valued domain rb E {0, 1, 2, 3} with the 
following functional specification: 
b (1) 
where the mappings defined by each response function 
hb,r0(a) are given by 
hb,o(a) = bo hb,I(a) = { 
bo if a= ao 
bl if a= a1 
hb,a(a) = b1 hb,2(a) = { bl if a= ao bo if a= a1 
The response-function variable for A has a two-valued 
domain r a E { 0, 1} with the functional specification: 
a !a(ra) = ha,r. () 
where 
ha,o() = ao 
The prior probability on the response functions P(rb) 
and P(ra) in conjunction with fb(a, rb) and fa(ra) fully 
parameterizes the model. 
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For each observable variable X;, there will be a func­
tion that maps the value of X; 's observable causal in­
fluences pa(X;) and X; 's response-function variable r.,, 
to the value of X; 
x; = fx;(pa(x;),r.,.) 
If the model is complete (such as the functional model 
described in [Pearl and Verma, 1991]), all response 
functions will be mutually independent, and each will 
be characterized by a prior probability P(rx.). How­
ever, when some variables are left out of the analy­
sis, the response functions of the remaining variables 
(x1, ... , xn) may be dependent and, in principle, a 
joint probability P(r.,1, . • .  , r.,n) would be required. In 
practice, only local dependencies will be needed. 
If one assumes that two variables A and B are de­
pendent via some exogenous common cause, then we 
create an edge between ra and rb and specify the joint 
distribution P(ra, rb)· This treatment of latent vari­
ables will be utilized in the applications discussed in 
Sections 4 and 5. 
3.2 FUNCTIONAL EXPRESSION 
We now derive an expression for P( c*la*, o) in terms 
of the underlying functional model. 
The connection between the factual and counterfactual 
worlds is discussed in [Balke and Pearl, 1994] where it 
is argued that the response-function variables should 
assume the same values in both worlds. For the party 
example, this invariance allows the response function 
variables ra and rb to be shared between the networks 
corresponding to the two worlds (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Factual (A, B) and counterfactual (A*, B*) 
worlds for the functional analysis of the structure A­
B. The response-function variables ra and rb (summa­
rizing all exogenous influences on A and B) attain the 
same value in the real and counterfactual worlds. 
Let r = (r.,1,r.,2, • • •  ,r.,..) represent the set of 
response-function variables for all the variables in the 
model. Given the value of r, all variables X; E X 
are functionally determined according to the recursive 
function: 
x; = j.,,(r) 
= /x,(fu1(r),/u2(r), ... ,/u.(r),r.,J 
where pa(X;) = {U1.U2, ... ,Uk} C X are the causal 
influences of X; in the model. 
If a set of variables A C X in the model are externally 
forced to the value a, then according to the action­
based semantics of [Pearl, 1993a], the recursive func­
tion becomes 
x; = J:,(r) 
f.,,(r.,.) if X; t$. A and pa(X;) = 0 
{ 
i
; if X; E A 
fx, (/�1 (r ), fi2 (r ), .. .  , f�. (r ), rx.) otherwise 
The counterfactual probability P(c* Ia*, o) may be 
rewritten 
P(c*la*, o) = P(c*, ola*) P(ola*) 
Since an action can only affect its descendants in the 
graph [Pearl, 1994] we have P(ola) = P(o) which is 
readily computed from the probabilistic specification. 
P( c*, olD.*) may be evaluated in terms of the functional 
model by summing the probabilities of the response­
function configurations which are consistent with the 
arguments ( c*, a*, o). Formally, 
P(c*, olD.*) 
where 
R = {rl'v'o:,Eo[x; = fx,(r)] and 'v'xjEe•[xj = J:;(r)]} 
Hence, the counterfactual probability may be written 
in terms of the structure {pa(x;)} and parameters P(r) 
of the functional model: 
P(c* Iii*, o) = ErER 
P(r) 
P(o) 
(2) 
In the next section this expression will be optimized 
under the constraints imposed by the probabilistic 
specification. 
3.3 CONSTRAINTS AND OPTIMIZATION 
The probabilistic specification P( x; I pa( x;)) for a com­
plete model imposes a set of constraints on P(rx,) of 
the form 
LP(rx.)t(rx,;x;,pa(x;)) (3) 
where the characteristic function t indicates which val­
ues of rx, map the particular value of X; 's causal in­
fluences (pa(x;)) to the specific value of X; (x;), i.e. 
t(r.,,; x;, pa(x;)) 
{ 1 if X;= fx, (pa(x;), rx,) 
0 otherwise 
For an incomplete model, if X; and Xj are assumed to 
have an exogenous common cause, then the common 
constraint for these two variables will be given instead 
by 
P(x;, xilpa(x;)- {xi},pa(xj)- {x;}) = (4) 
L P(r:c, r.,Jt(rx , ; Xi, pa(xi))t(rx; ; Xj, pa(Xj )) 
Note that the constraints m Eq. ( 4) are linear in 
P(rx,, rxJ· 
For example, in the party story (which is complete 
with two binary variables A and B) the constraints 
are given by 
P(btlao) 
P(bJial) 
P(at) 
P(rb=2) + P(rb=3) 
P(rb=l) + P(rF3) 
P(ra=l) 
Additional subjective constraints may also be imposed 
on the underlying functional model. For example, we 
may subjectively believe that Bob is never spiteful 
against Ann, which can be simply written P(rb=2) = 0 
and added to the existing set of constraints. 
Given the entire set of linear constraints and the objec­
tive function from Eq. (2), the bounds may be evalu­
ated using techniques for optimizing non-linear objec­
tive functions under linear constraints (Scales, 1 985) . 
In general, the optimization procedure may converge 
to a local minima/maxima which would produce false 
bounds. If the objective is to prove that the counter­
factual probability falls within a certain range, care 
must be taken to ensure that global optima are found. 
If the objective function given by Eq. (2) is linear, the 
minimum/maximum may be determined using linear 
programming techniques. In this case, when the prob­
lem size is small enough, we may also derive symbolic 
bounds to the counterfactual probability in terms of 
the probabilistic specification. This is accomplished 
by tracking the conditions that lead to the various de­
cisions in the Simplex Tableau algorithm. This pro­
cedure generates a decision tree where each leaf node 
contains a symbolic solution [Balke and Pearl, 1993]. 
4 APPLICATION TO CLINICAL 
TRIALS WITH IMPERFECT 
COMPLIANCE 
Consider an experimental study where random as­
signment has taken place but compliance is not per­
fect (i.e., the treatment received differs from that as­
signed). It is well known that under such conditions 
a bias may be introduced, in the sense that the true 
causal effect of the treatment may deviate su bstan­
tially from the causal effect computed by simply com­
paring subjects receiving the treatment with those not 
receiving the treatment. Because the subjects who did 
not comply with the assignment may be precisely those 
who would have responded adversely (positively) to 
the treatment, the actual effect of the treatment, when 
applied uniformly to the population, might be substan­
tially less (more) effective than the study reveals. 
In an attempt to avert this bias, economists have de­
vised correctional formulas based on an "instrumen­
tal variables" model ([Bowden and Turkington, 19841) 
which, in general, do not hold outside the lin­
ear regression model. A recent analysis by 
[Efron and Feldman, 1991] departs from the linear 
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regression model, but still makes restrictive com­
mitments to a particular mode of interaction be­
tween compliance and response. [Robins, 1989] 
and [Manski, 1990] derived nonparametric bounds on 
treatment effects using different techniques; how­
ever their bounds are not tight. [Holland, 1988] has 
given a general formulation of the problem (which 
he called "encouragement design") in terms of Ru­
bin's model of causal effect and has outlined its rela­
tion to path analysis and structural equations models. 
[Angrist et al., 1993], also invoking Rubin's model, 
have identified a set of assumptions under which the 
"Instrumental Variable" formula is valid for certain 
subpopulations. These subpopulations cannot be iden­
tified from empirical observation alone, and the need 
remains to devise alternative, assumption-free formu­
las for assessing the effect of treatment over the pop­
ulation as a whole. In this section, we derive bounds 
on the average treatment effect that rely solely on ob­
served quantities and are universal, that is, valid no 
matter what model actually governs the interactions 
between compliance and response. 
The canonical partial-compliance setting can be graph­
ically modeled as shown in Figure 2. 
Observed 
Response 
Figure 2: Graphical representation of causal dependen­
cies in a randomized clinical trial with partial compli­
ance. 
We assume that Z, D, andY are observed binary vari­
ables where Z represents the (randomized) treatment 
assignment, D is the treatment actually received, and 
Y is the observed response. U represents all factors, 
both observed and unobserved, that may influence the 
outcome Y and the treatment D. To facilitate the 
notation, we let z, d, and y represent, respectively, 
the values taken by the variables Z, D, and Y, with 
the following interpretation: z E { zo, zt} , zr asserts 
that treatment has been assigned (zo, its negation); 
dE {do, dt}, d1 asserts that treatment has been ad­
ministered (do, its negation); and y E {yo, yt}, Yl as­
serts a positive observed response (y0, its negation). 
The domain of U remains unspecified and may, in gen­
eral, combine the spaces of several random variables, 
both discrete and continuous. 
The graphical model reflects two assumptions of inde­
pendence: 
1. The treatment assignment does not influence Y 
directly, but only through the actual treatment 
D, that is, 
z _II Y I {D,U} (5) 
In practice, any direct effect Z might have on 
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Y would be adjusted for through the use of a 
placebo. 
2. Z and U are marginally independent, that is, 
Z II U. This independence is partly ensured 
through the randomization of Z, which rules out 
a common cause for both Z and U. The absence 
of a direct path from Z to U represents the as­
sumption that a person's disposition to comply 
with or deviate from a given assignment is not in 
itself affected by the assignment; any such effect 
can be viewed as part of the disposition. 
These assumptions impose on the joint distribution1 
the decomposition 
P{y, d, z, u) = P(yld, u) P(dlz, u) P(z) P(u) (6) 
which, of course, cannot be observed directly because 
U is a latent variable. However, the marginal distribu­
tion P(y, d, z) and, in particular, the conditional dis­
tributions P(y, dlz), z E {zo, zt}, are observed, and the 
challenge is to assess the causal effect of D on Y from 
these distributions. 2 
In addition to the independence assumption above, the 
causal model of Figure 2 reflects claims about the be­
havior of the population under external interventions. 
In particular, it reflects the assumption that P(yld, u) 
is a stable quantity: the probability that an individ­
ual with characteristics U = u given treatment D = d 
will respond with Y = y remains the same, regardless 
of how the treatment was selected - be it by choice 
or by policy. Therefore, if we wish to predict the dis­
tribution of Y under a condition where the treatment 
D is applied uniformly to the population, we should 
calculate 
P(y* id*) L P(yld, u)P(u) (7) 
u 
Likewise, if we are interested in estimating the average 
change in Y due to treatment, we define the average 
causal effect, ACE(D-+ Y) ([Holland, 1988]), as 
ACE(D-+ Y) (8) 
The task of causal inference is then to estimate or 
bound the expression in Eq. (8), given the observed 
probabilities P(y, dlzo) and P(y, dlzr). This may be 
accomplished by following the procedure detailed in 
Section 3.3 where the objective function to be opti­
mized is the difference between the two counterfactual 
probabilities on the right-hand side of Eq. (8). 
First, the functional model corresponding to the prob­
abilistic model of Figure 2 must be specified. For 
each of the observable variables in the model (Z, D, 
1 We take the liberty of denoting the prior distribution 
of U by P(u), even though U may consist of continuous 
variables. 
2In practice, of course, only a finite sample of P(y, dlz) 
will be observed, but since our task is one of identification, 
not estimation, we make the large-sample assumption and 
consider P(y,dlz) as given. 
and Y), we define the corresponding response-function 
variables (rz, rd, and ry, respectively). 
Figure 3 shows the graphical representation of the re­
sulting functional model. Because D and Y are as­
sumed to be influenced by an unobservable common 
cause, the response-function variables rd and ry are 
connected by an edge. 
The states of the variables r d and r y have the following 
interpretations: 
Figure 3: A structure equivalent to that of Figure 1 but 
employing response-function variables rz, rd and ry. 
D is a deterministic function of the variable Z and 
rd E {0, 1 , 2, 3}: 
d = fd(z, rd) = hd,rd(z) 
where 
hd,o(z) =do hd,t(z) = { 
do if z = zo 
dl if Z = Z1 
hd,3(z) = dt hd,2(z) = 
{ 
dt if z = zo 
do if Z = Zt 
Similarly, Y is a deterministic function of D and ry E 
{0, 1, 2, 3}: 
y 
where 
hy,o(d) =Yo 
hy,3(d) = Yt 
fy(d, ry) = hy,r.(d) (9) 
hy,t(d) = { Yo 
if d =do 
Yt if d = dt 
hy,2(d) = { Yt 
if d =do 
Yo if d = dt 
The correspondence between the states of variables 
rd and ry and the potential response vectors in the 
Rubin's model [Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983] is rather 
transparent: each state corresponds to a counterfac­
tual statement specifying how a unit in the population 
(e.g., a person) would have reacted to any given in­
put. For example, rd = 1 represents units with perfect 
compliance, while rd = 2 represents units with per­
fect defiance. Similarly, ry = 1 represents units with 
perfect response to treatment, while ry = 0 represents 
units with no response (y = y0) regardless of treat­
ment. The counterfactual variables Y1 and Yo usually 
invoked in Rubin's model can be obtained from ry as 
follows: 
{ 
.f d } _ { 1 if ry = 1 or ry = 3 Yt = Y 1 D = 1 
- 0 otherwise 
Yo =  {Y if D = do} = 
{ 6 if r11 = 2 or r11 = 3 otherwise 
In general, treatment response and compliance atti­
tudes may not be independent, hence the arrow rd ----+ 
r11 in Figure 3. The joint distribution over rd x r11 re­
quires 15 independent parameters, and these parame­
ters are sufficient for specifying the model of Figure 3, 
P(y, d, z, rd , r11) = P(yid, r11)P(d[rd, z)P(z)P(rd, r11), 
because Y and D stand in functional relation to their 
parents in the graph. The causal effect of the treat­
ment can now be obtained directly from Eqs. (7) and 
(9) according to Eq. (2), giving 
and 
P(y�[dr) 
P(y; [d�) 
P(r11=1) + P(ry=3) 
P(r11=2) + P(ry=3) 
(10) 
(11) 
ACE(D----+ Y) = P(r11=1)- P(r11=2) (12) 
4.1 LINEAR PROGRAMMING 
FORMULATION 
In this section we will explicate the relationship be­
tween the parameters of the observed distribution 
P(y, d[z) and the parameters of the joint distribution 
P(rd,ry) of the response functions. This will lead di­
rectly to the linear constraints needed for minimiz­
ing/maximizing ACE(D----+ Y) given the observation 
P(y, d[z). 
The conditional distribution P(y, d[z) over the observ­
able variables is fully specified by eight parameters, 
which will be notated as follows: 
Poo.o = P(yo, da[zo) 
PoLo= P(yo, dt[zo) 
Pta o = P(yl, do[zo) 
PlLO = P(yt,dtlzo) 
The probabilistic constraints 
11 
L Pno = 1 
n=OO 
Poo 1 = P(yo,do[zt) 
Pou = P(yo,dtlzt) 
Pta. I= P(yt, do[zt) 
Pl t = P(yt,dtlzt) 
11 
L Pn.! = 1 
n=OO 
(13) 
further imply that p = (Poo.o, . . . , Ptu) can be spec­
ified by a point in six-dimensional space. This space 
will be referred to as P. 
The joint probability over rd x r11, P(rd , r11 ) , has 16 pa­
rameters and completely specifies the population un­
der study. These parameters will be notated as 
q;k = P(ra=j, r11=k) 
where j, k E {0, 1, 2, 3}. The probabilistic constraint 
3 3 
L:l:qjk = 1 
j=O 1:::::0 
implies that q specifies a point in 15-dimensional space. 
This space will be referred to as Q. 
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Eq. (12) can now be rewritten as a linear combination 
of the Q parameters: 
ACE(D- Y) = (14) 
Applying Eqs. (3) and ( 4) we can write the constraints 
which reflect the direct linear transformation from a 
point q in Q space to the corresponding point pin the 
observation space P: 
Poa.o qao + qor + qro + qll 
PoLo qzo + q22 + q3o + q32 
Pta o qoz + qo3 + q12 + q13 
P11.0 q21 + q23 + q31 + q33 
Poo.t qoo + qor + q2o + qzr 
Pou qro + q12 + q3o + q32 
Pw 1 qo2 + qo3 + qn + q23 
Ptu qll + q13 + q31 + q33 
which will be written in matrix form, p = Pi[. 
Given a point p in P space, the strict lower bound 
on ACE(D----+ Y ) can be determined by solving the 
following linear programming problem: 
Minimize: qat + qu + qzt +qat - qo2 - q12 - q22 - q32 
Subject to: 
Pq (15) 
qjk > Oforj,k E {0,1,2,3} 
However, for problems of this size, the procedure may 
be used for deriving symbolic expressions as well, lead­
ing to the following lower bound on the treatment ef­
fect 
ACE( D - Y) ?:: 
max 
P11.1 + Poo . o-1 
PlLO + POO.l - 1 
Pu.o- P11.1- Pto.r- Por.o -Pto.o 
Pn.l- P11.0-Pto.o- Pou-P10.1 
-Pou -Pto.t 
-PoLo - Pro.o 
Pao.t - Pou - Pto.t -PoLo- Poo.o 
Poo.o -PoLo- Pto.o-Pou -Poo.r 
Similarly, the upper bound is given by 
ACE(D ___, Y) ::; 
mm 
1 - POLl - PlO.O 
1 -PoLo- Pto.t 
-pot.o + Pou + Poo.r + Pu.o + Poo.o 
-pou + Ptu + Poo.t + Pot.o + Poo.o 
Pru + Poo.1 
P11.0 + Poo o 
-Pto.l + P11.1 + Poo.l + Pll o + Pto.o 
-Pro . o + Pu o + Poo.o + P11 .1 + P10.1 
(16) 
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We may also derive bounds on the treatment responses 
under the condition where treatment is uniformly ap­
plied to the population by optimizing Eqs. (10) and 
(11) individually (under the same linear constraints). 
The resulting bounds are: 
max{ 
and 
Pta o + PtLo- Poo . l - P111 } 
PlO.l 
PlO.O 
PoLo+ P1o.o- Poo.1 - Pou 
:::; P(yi id�) :::; 
{ PoLo+ Pto.o + P10.1 + P11.1 } 
. 1- Poo 1 min 1- Poo o 
Pto.o + PtLo + Pou + Pta. I 
Pn.o } 
P11.1 
-poo.o- Pot o + Poo.1 + P11.1 
-PoLo-P1o.o + P10.1 + P11.1 
:::; P(y�idi):::; 
mm 
Poo.o + Pu.o + Pto 1 + P11.1 
. 
{ 
� = ���:� 
} Pla.o + Pl1.0 + PoO.l + P11.1 
These bounds improve upon the results of 
[Manski, 1990]. In addition, one can prove that these 
are the tightest possible assumption-free bounds. 
Examples and additional results regarding bounds on 
treatment effects in partial compliance studies are pre­
sented in [Balke and Pearl, 1993]. 
5 APP LICATIONS TO LIABILITY 
JUDGMENT 
Evaluation of counterfactual probabilities could be en­
lightening in some legal cases in which a plaintiff claims 
that a defendant's actions were responsible for the 
plaintiff's misfortune. Improper rulings can easily be 
issued without an adequate treatment of counterfactu­
als. Consider the following hypothetical and fictitious 
case study, especially crafted to accentuate the dispar­
ity between different methods of analysis. 
The marketer of PeptAid (antacid medication) ran­
domly mailed out product samples to 10% of the 
households in the city of Stress, California. In a follow­
up study, researchers determined for each individual 
whether they received the PeptAid sample, whether 
they consumed PeptAid, and whether they developed 
peptic ulcers in the following month. 
The causal structure which describes the influences 
in this scenario is identical to the partial-compliance 
model given by Figure 2, where z1 asserts that 
PeptAid was received from the marketer; d1 asserts 
that PeptAid was consumed; and y1 asserts that pep­
tic ulceration occurred. The data showed the following 
distribution: 
P(z!) = 0.1 
P(yo, dolzo) = 0.32 
P(yo, dtlzo) = 0.32 
P(y,,dolzo) = 0.04 
P(y,, dtlzo) = 0.32 
P(yo, dolzt) = 0.02 
P(yo,dtlzt) = 0.17 
P(yt,dolzt) = 0. 67 
P(yt. dt lzt) = 0.14 
This data indicates a high-correlation between those 
individuals who consumed PeptAid and those who de­
veloped peptic ulcers in the following month 
P(Ytidt) = 0. 50 P(ytjdo) = 0.26 
In addition, the intent-to-treat analysis showed that 
those individuals who received the PeptAid samples 
had a 45% greater chance of developing peptic ulcers 
P(ytlzo) = 0.36 
The plaintiff (Mr. Smith), having heard of the study, 
litigated against both the marketing firm and the 
PeptAid producer. The plaintiff's attorney argued 
against the producer, claiming that the consumption 
of PeptAid triggered his client's ulcer and resulting 
medical expenses. Likewise, the plaintiff's attorney 
argued against the marketer, claiming that his client 
would not have developed an ulcer, if the marketer had 
not distributed the product samples. 
The defense attorney, representing both the manufac­
turer and marketer of PeptAid, though, rebutted this 
argument, stating that the high correlation between 
PeptAid consumption and ulcers was attributable to a 
common factor, namely, pre-ulcer discomfort. Individ­
uals with gastrointestinal discomfort would be much 
more likely to both use PeptAid and develop stomach 
ulcers. To bolster his clients' claims, the defense at­
torney introduced expert analysis of the data showing 
that, on the average, consumption of PeptAid actually 
decreases an individual's chances of developing ulcers 
by at least 15%. 
Indeed, the application of Eqs. 16 and 17 results m 
the following bounds on the average causal effect of 
PeptAid consumption on peptic ulceration 
-0.23 :S ACE(D- Y):::; -0.15 
and proves that PeptAid is beneficial to the population 
as a whole. 
The plaintiff's attorney, though, stressed the distinc­
tion between the average treatment effects for the 
entire population and the sub-population consisting 
of those individuals who, like his client, received the 
PeptAid sample, consumed it and then developed ul­
cers. Analysis of the population data indicated that 
had PeptAid not been distributed, Mr. Smith would 
have had at most a 7% chance of developing ulcers re­
gardless of any confounding factors such as pre-ulcer 
pain. Likewise, if Mr. Smith had not consumed 
PeptAid, he would have had at most a 7% chance of 
developing ulcers. 
The damaging statistics against the marketer are ob­
tained by evaluating the bounds on the probability 
that the plaintiff would have developed a peptic ulcer 
if he had not received the PeptAid sample, given that 
he in fact received the sample PeptAid, consumed the 
PeptAid, and developed peptic ulcers. This probabil­
ity may be written in terms of the functional model 
parameters: 
P(rz==l )[q13 + Q31 + Qaa] 
P(yt, d1, z!) 
But, since Z is a root node in the probabilistic speci­
fication, P(rz==l) == P(zt); therefore, 
= 
Ql3 + Q31 + Q33 
P(yt, ddzt) 
Q13 + Q31 + Q33 
Ptu 
This expression is linear with respect to the Q pa­
rameters; therefore, we may use linear optimization 
to derive symbolic bounds on the counterfactual prob­
ability with respect to the probabilistic specification 
P(y,dlz): 
1 { 
--max 
P11.1 
Ptl.l � Poo.o } 
P11 0- POO.l - PtO.l 
Pto.o - Po1.1 - P10.1 
� P(y�/z�,zt,dt,YI) � 
-1- min 
{ Pta.�� �11.0 } 
Ptl.t 1 - Poo.o- P10.1 
Similarly, the damaging evidence against PeptAid's 
producer is obtained by evaluating the bounds on 
the counterfactual probability P(yi ld�, Yt. d1, zt). In 
terms of the Q parameters the counterfactual proba­
bility is written: 
= 
Qll + Q13 + Q31 + Q33 
Q13 + Q33 
P11.1 
If we minimize/maxirniee the numerator given the lin­
ear constraints, we arrive at the following bounds: 
1 { -- max 
Ptt.t Pll.l- Po� .o- Pn.o } Pto.o- POl.l - PtO.l 
� P(yi jd�. Zt, dt, yt) � 
1 { P11.1 
} -- min Pto.o + Pu.o 
Ptu 1 - Poo o- Plo.t 
Substituting the observed distribution P(y, d/z) into 
these formulas, the following bounds were obtained 
o.oo � P(y� /z0, z1, d1, Yt) � o.o7 
0.00 � P(y�jd�,Zt,dt,Yd �0.07 
We can write the average causal effects for the sub­
population resembling the plaintiff by conditioning the 
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counterfactual probabilities in Eqs. (10) and (11) on 
the features of the plaintiff. 
ACE(D-> Y/zt,dt,Yt) = 
P(yi jd;:, Zt, dt, Yt)- P(yi jd�, Z1, dt, Y1) 
Counterfactual probabilities have the property that if 
the counterfactual antecedent is implied by the real­
world observation, then the probability of the coun­
terfactual consequent is the same as in the real-world 
given the observations: 
P(c* /a•, o) = P(c = c* /a) 
Therefore, 
and 
0.93 � ACE(D-> Y/z1,d1,yt) � 1.00 
0.93 � ACE(Z- Y/zt, dt, YI) � 1.00 
At least 93% of the people in the plaintiff's subpopu­
lation would not have developed ulcers had they not 
been encouraged to take PeptAid (zo), or similarly, 
had they not taken PeptAid (do) . This lends very 
strong support for the plaintiff's claim that he was ad­
versely affected by the marketer and producer's actions 
and product. 
The judge ruled in favor of the plaintiff. PeptAid 
withdrew the product from the market, and initiated 
a research effort to identify observable characteris­
tics of those individuals who are adversely effected by 
PeptAid. 
6 CONCLUSION 
This paper has developed a procedure for evaluat­
ing bounds on counterfactual probabilities. At first 
thought, one may believe that assumption-free bounds 
would be very weak bounds, but this paper has demon­
strated that in certain circumstances, the results of 
such analysis could provide compelling evidence for 
legal decisions and development of treatment policies. 
The corner-stone of counterfactual analysis is the 
use of functional models with response-function vari­
ables, for which the counterfactual probability may be 
uniquely written. The task of determining bounds in­
volves the optimization of this expression under the 
constraints imposed by the known probabilistic spec­
ification. In general, the task is reduced to the op­
timization of a polynomial function subject to linear 
constraints, which introduces the problem of local min­
ima/maxima. 
If the counterfactual probability is linear with respect 
to the functional specification, then the bounds are 
easily found via linear programming. In addition, in 
some cases we may be able to derive symbolic bounds 
on counterfactual probabilities in terms of the prob­
abilistic specification. Such bounds were derived in 
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applications involving: ( 1) the determination of treat­
ment efficacy from studies where subjects do not com­
ply perfectly with treatment assignment, and (2) the 
determination of liability in product-safety litigation. 
Acknowledgements 
The research was partially supported by Air Force 
grant #AFOSR 90 0136, NSF grant #IRI-9200918, 
Northrop Micro grant #92-123, and Rockwell Micro 
grant #92-122. Alexander Balke was supported by 
the Fannie and John Hertz Foundation. 
References 
[Angrist et a/., 1993] J.D. Angrist, G.W. Imbens, and 
D.B. Rubin. Identification of causal effects using in­
strumental variables. Technical Report No. 136, De­
partment of Economics, Harvard University, Cam­
bridge, MA, June 1993. 
[Balke and Pearl, 1993] Alexander Balke and Judea 
Pearl. Nonparametric bounds on causal effects from 
partial compliance data. Technical Report R-199, 
Cognitive Systems Laboratory, Computer Science 
Department, UCLA, September 1993. Submitted to 
the Journal of the American Statistical Association 
(JASA). 
[Balke and Pearl, 1994] Alexander Balke and Judea 
Pearl. Probabilistic evaluation of counterfactual 
queries. Technical Report R-213, Cognitive Systems 
Laboratory, Computer Science Department, UCLA, 
1994. To appear in AAAI-94. 
[Bowden and Turkington, 1984] Roger J. Bowden and 
Darrell A. Turkington. Instrumental Variables. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1984. 
[Druzdzel and Simon, 1993] Marek J. Druzdzel and 
Herbert A. Simon. Causality in bayesian belief net­
works. In Proceedings of the 9th Annual Conference 
on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (U AI-93 }, 
pages 3-11, 1993. 
[Efron and Feldman, 1991] B. Efron and D. Feldman. 
Compliance as an explanatory variable in clinical 
trials. Journal of the American Statistical Associa­
tion, 86(413):9-26, March 1991. 
[Holland, 1988] Paul W. Holland. Causal inference, 
path analysis, and recursive structural equations 
models. In C. Clagg, editor, Sociological Method­
ology, pages 449-484. American Sociological Associ­
ation, Washington, DC, 1988. 
[Manski, 1990] Charles F. Manski. Nonparametric 
bounds on treatment effects. American Economic 
Review, Papers and Proceedings, 80:319-323, May 
1990. 
[Pearl and Verma, 1991] Judea Pearl and Thomas 
Verma. A theory of inferred causation. In James 
Allen, Richard Fikes, and Erik Sandewall, edi­
tors, Principles of Knowledge Representation and 
Reasoning: Proceedings of the Second Interna­
tional Conference, pages 441-452. Morgan Kauf­
mann Publishers, San Mateo, CA, 1991. 
[Pearl, 1993a] Judea Pearl. Aspects of graphical mod­
els connected with causality. In Proceedings ofthe 
49th Session of the International Statistical Insti­
tute, pages 391-401, Florence, Italy, August 1993. 
Short version in Statistical Science. 
[Pearl, 1993b] Judea Pearl. From Adams' condition­
als to default expressions, causal conditionals, and 
counterfactuals. Technical Report R-193, UCLA 
Cognitive Systems Laboratory, February 1993. To 
appear in Festschrift for Ernest Adams, Cambridge 
University Press, 1994. 
[Pearl, 1993c] Judea Pearl. From conditional oughts 
to qualitative decision theory. In David Beckerman 
and Abe Mamdani, editors, Uncertainty in Artificial 
Intelligence, Proceedings of the Ninth Conference, 
pages 12-20. Morgan Kaufmann, 1993. 
[Pearl, 1994} Judea Pearl. A probabilistic calculus of 
actions. Technical Report R-212, UCLA Cognitive 
Systems Laboratory, 1994. This volume (UAI-94). 
[Poole, 1993] David Poole. Probabilistic Horn abduc­
tion and Bayesian networks. Artificial Intelligence, 
64(1 ):81-130, 1993. 
[Robins, 1989] J .M. Robins. The analysis of random­
ized and non-randomized AIDS treatment trials us­
ing a new approach to causal inference in longitudi­
nal studies. In L. Sechrest, H. Freeman, and A. Mul­
ley, editors, Health Service Research Methodology: A 
Focus on AIDS, pages 113-159. NCHSR, U.S. Pub­
lic Health Service, 1989. 
[Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983] P. Rosenbaum and 
D. Rubin. The central role of propensity score in 
observational studies for causal effects. Biometrika, 
70:41-55, 1983. 
[Rubin, 1974] Donald B. Rubin. Estimating causal ef­
fects of treatments in randomized and nonrandom­
ized studies. Journal of Educational Psychology, 
66(5):688-701, 1974. 
[Scales, 1985] L.E. Scales. Introduction to Non-Linear 
Optimization. Springer-Verlag, New York, 1985. 
